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Abstract  1	 ﾠ
Stress  may  promote  the  onset  of  psychopathology  by  disrupting  reward  processing.   2	 ﾠ
However,  the  extent  to  which  stress  impairs  reward  processing,  rather  than  incentive  3	 ﾠ
processing  more  generally,  is  unclear.  To  evaluate  the  specificity  of  stress-induced  4	 ﾠ
reward processing disruption, 100 psychiatrically healthy females were administered a  5	 ﾠ
probabilistic stimulus selection task enabling comparison of sensitivity to reward-driven  6	 ﾠ
(Go) and punishment-driven (NoGo) learning under either ‘no stress’ or ‘stress’ (threat- 7	 ﾠ
of-shock) conditions. Cortisol samples and self-report measures were collected. Contrary  8	 ﾠ
to  hypotheses,  the  groups  did  not  differ  significantly  in  task  performance  or  cortisol  9	 ﾠ
reactivity. However, further analyses focusing only on individuals under ‘stress’ who  10	 ﾠ
were high responders with regard to both cortisol reactivity and self-reported negative  11	 ﾠ
affect revealed reduced reward sensitivity relative to individuals tested in the ‘no stress’  12	 ﾠ
condition;  importantly,  these  deficits  were  reward-specific.  Overall,  findings  provide  13	 ﾠ
preliminary  evidence  that  stress-reactive  individuals  show  diminished  sensitivity  to  14	 ﾠ
reward but not punishment under stress. While such results highlight the possibility that  15	 ﾠ
stress-induced anhedonia might be an important mechanism linking stress to affective  16	 ﾠ
disorders, future studies are necessary to confirm this conjecture.  17	 ﾠ
  18	 ﾠ
  19	 ﾠ
Keywords:  affect-cognition interactions, stress, anhedonia, reward, punishment, cortisol,  20	 ﾠ
depression, emotion  21	 ﾠ 
INTRODUCTION  1	 ﾠ
    2	 ﾠ
  Unraveling the connection between life stress and the onset of affective disorders  3	 ﾠ
continues to be a critical but complex endeavor. The reward system is often dysfunctional  4	 ﾠ
in affective disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and may play a central  5	 ﾠ
role in bridging these phenomena. Specifically, mounting evidence suggests that stress  6	 ﾠ
attenuates  reward  responsiveness  through  its  influence  on  underlying  neurobiological  7	 ﾠ
processes (Anisman and Matheson, 2005).  However, a central point of ambiguity in this  8	 ﾠ
domain concerns the specificity of the impact of stress on reward processing.  In order to  9	 ﾠ
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms at play, it is necessary to  10	 ﾠ
clarify whether such effects might be generalizable to other valence-laden stimuli (e.g.,  11	 ﾠ
punishment) and thus reflective of incentive processing more broadly.  12	 ﾠ
  A large body of preclinical work suggests that uncontrollable negative stressors  13	 ﾠ
blunt sensitivity to reward via disruption of mesocorticolimbic pathways.  The majority  14	 ﾠ
of research investigating relationships between stressors and reward processing has been  15	 ﾠ
performed  in  non-human  animal  studies.    In  rodents,  uncontrollable  stress  leads  to  16	 ﾠ
“anhedonic” behavior and dysfunction within mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic pathways  17	 ﾠ
critically implicated in incentive motivation and hedonic coding (Anisman and Matheson,  18	 ﾠ
2005;  Henn  and  Vollmayr,  2005).    Surprisingly,  relatively  few  researchers  have  19	 ﾠ
empirically  examined  putative  relationships  between  stress  and  the  reward  system  in  20	 ﾠ
humans.  In an early human study, Berenbaum and Connelly (1993) found that real-life  21	 ﾠ
acute stressors, including military training and final examinations, reduced self-reported  22	 ﾠ
pleasure  and  positive  affect  in  two  separate  samples.    Moreover,  this  stress-induced  23	 ﾠ
reduction  in  hedonic  capacity  was  strongest  in  participants  with  family  histories  of  24	 ﾠ
depression.  In a controlled laboratory setting, Bogdan and Pizzagalli (2006) reported that  25	 ﾠ
an  acute  stressor  (threat-of-shock)  blunted  reward  responsiveness—specifically,  26	 ﾠ
participants’ ability to modulate behavior as a function of rewards (see Bogdan et al.,  27	 ﾠ
2011 and Liu et al., 2011 for independent replications).  Using the same probabilistic  28	 ﾠ
reward task, participants with high levels of perceived life stress were characterized by  29	 ﾠ
decreased  reward  responsiveness  (Pizzagalli  et  al.,  2007).    Recently,  Cavanagh  and  30	 ﾠ
colleagues  (2010)  employed  a  social  evaluative  threat  stress  manipulation  while  31	 ﾠ
participants completed a probabilistic stimulus selection task.  They found that stress led  32	 ﾠ
to relatively decreased reward learning in individuals with high trait-level punishment  33	 ﾠ
sensitivity (as assessed using the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) scale) as compared  34	 ﾠ
to  an  enhanced  reward  learning  bias  in  individuals  with  lower  trait-level  punishment  35	 ﾠ
sensitivity.  Complementing these behavioral findings, two recent neuroimaging studies  36	 ﾠ
reported  that  stress  inductions  (e.g.,  cold  pressor  task,  aversive  movie  clips)  37	 ﾠ
superimposed on reward processing paradigms reduced activity in brain areas involved in  38	 ﾠ
reward processing, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsal  39	 ﾠ
striatum (Ossewaarde et al., 2011; Porcelli et al., 2012).  40	 ﾠ
In spite of these findings, it remains unclear whether such stress-induced effects  41	 ﾠ
are specific to rewards or extend to negatively-valenced stimuli, such as punishment.  In  42	 ﾠ
Cavanagh’s  aforementioned  study  (2010),  social  evaluative  stress  led  to  heightened  43	 ﾠ
sensitivity to punishment in individuals with high trait-level punishment sensitivity, but  44	 ﾠ
lower sensitivity to punishment in individuals with low trait-level punishment sensitivity.   45	 ﾠ
In  related  research,  various  prior  studies  have  examined  aversive  processing  changes  46	 ﾠ 
using threat of shock manipulations and reported stress-induced increases in aversive  1	 ﾠ
processing during affective Stroop tasks (e.g., Edwards, Burt, & Lipp, 2006; Edwards,  2	 ﾠ
Burt, & Lipp, 2010; Robinson, Letkiewicz, Overstreet, Ernst, & Grillon, 2011).  In a  3	 ﾠ
recent fMRI study investigating the neural circuitry underlying such findings, Robinson  4	 ﾠ
and colleagues (2012) reported that enhanced dorsomedial prefrontal cortex amygdala  5	 ﾠ
connectivity  during  the  processing  of  aversive  stimuli  under  stress  (threat  of  6	 ﾠ
unpredictable  foot  shock  in  the  scanner)  might  underlie  stress-induced  threat  biases.   7	 ﾠ
Collectively,  these  studies  raise  the  possibility  that,  unlike  reward  sensitivity,   8	 ﾠ
punishment sensitivity might be potentiated under stress.       9	 ﾠ
The current study was designed to assess the specificity of the deleterious effect  10	 ﾠ
of stress on reward processing by comparing the impact of stress on reward-related (e.g.,  11	 ﾠ
positive  feedback)  versus  punishment-related  (e.g.,  negative  feedback)  learning.    To  12	 ﾠ
achieve this aim, a probabilistic stimulus selection task (PSST; modified from Frank et  13	 ﾠ
al., 2004) was implemented in conjunction with an acute stressor (threat-of-shock) using  14	 ﾠ
a  between-subjects  design  (e.g.,  ‘stress’  vs.  ‘no-stress’).    The  current  study  design  15	 ﾠ
differed from previous studies in this area (e.g., Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Bogdan et  16	 ﾠ
al., 2011) because it allowed evaluation of responsiveness to both positive and negative  17	 ﾠ
feedback.    This  enabled  us  to  ascertain  whether  purported  stress-induced  reward  18	 ﾠ
processing  deficits  reflected  specific  reductions  in  sensitivity  to  reward  feedback  vs.  19	 ﾠ
broad reductions in sensitivity to feedback in general (regardless of valence).  In addition,  20	 ﾠ
our experiment was initially designed to test whether the impact of stress on reward  21	 ﾠ
processing was conditional upon the stress being perceived as uncontrollable.  This was  22	 ﾠ
attempted by implementing both a ‘controllable’ and ‘uncontrollable’ stress condition,  23	 ﾠ
along with a ‘no stress’ condition.  However, this aspect of our stress manipulation was  24	 ﾠ
unsuccessful (see Supplement for detailed analyses) and thus the present report focuses  25	 ﾠ
on the comparison between ‘stress’ (collapsed across the two controllability subgroups)  26	 ﾠ
and ‘no-stress’ conditions.  Based on prior findings, we hypothesized that individuals  27	 ﾠ
under acute stress would exhibit reduced reward sensitivity (e.g., lower reward-related  28	 ﾠ
accuracy  and  a  reduced  reward-related  RT  bias,  as  detailed  in  the  Methods  section)  29	 ﾠ
relative to individuals in the no-stress condition.  Moreover, we hypothesized that reward  30	 ﾠ
sensitivity would be selectively more reduced relative to punishment sensitivity in those  31	 ﾠ
individuals completing the task under stress.   32	 ﾠ
  33	 ﾠ
MATERIALS AND METHODS  34	 ﾠ
Participants  35	 ﾠ
All study procedures were approved by Harvard University’s Committee on the Use of  36	 ﾠ
Human Subjects in Research.  One hundred (n = 100) female participants, 18 to 25 years  37	 ﾠ
old,  were  recruited  through  community  advertisements  and  the  Harvard  University  38	 ﾠ
Department  of  Psychology  Study  Pool.  Only  females  were  recruited  due  to  sex  39	 ﾠ
differences in psychological and hormonal responses to stress, and because women tend  40	 ﾠ
to demonstrate a more pronounced stress response than men (Nolen-Hoeksema and Hilt,  41	 ﾠ
2009).  All subjects were right-handed, non-smokers, with normal or corrected-to-normal  42	 ﾠ
vision,  no  color-blindness,  and  no  known  current  or  past  neurological,  psychiatric  or  43	 ﾠ
medical illnesses.  Prior to participation, all individuals were screened over the phone to  44	 ﾠ
determine study eligibility.  The evaluation included diagnostic screening questions from  45	 ﾠ
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer,  46	 ﾠ 
Gibbon and Williams, 1995), more detailed questions from the depression and substance  1	 ﾠ
abuse  modules,  and  a  handedness  questionnaire  (Chapman  and  Chapman,  1987).   2	 ﾠ
Subjects were excluded if they could speak or read Japanese because one of the tasks  3	 ﾠ
(PSST) included Hiragana symbols.  Individuals who met eligibility requirements were  4	 ﾠ
invited for an experimental session.  Prior to the session, participants were randomized to  5	 ﾠ
one of three experimental conditions: ‘no stress’ (n = 29), ‘controllable stress’ (n = 35),  6	 ﾠ
or ‘uncontrollable stress’ (n = 36).  Data from five participants (two from the ‘no stress’  7	 ﾠ
group, one from the ‘controllable stress’ group and two from the ‘uncontrollable stress’  8	 ﾠ
group)  were  excluded  because  they  never  met  performance  criteria  (see  Modified  9	 ﾠ
Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task (PSST) section) in the training phase of the PSST.     10	 ﾠ
Thus,  95  participants  were  included  in  the  analyses:  ‘no  stress’  group  (n  =  27),  11	 ﾠ
‘controllable stress’ group (n = 34), and ‘uncontrollable stress’ group (n = 34).  However,  12	 ﾠ
given the lack of success of the controllability aspect of our stress manipulation (see  13	 ﾠ
Supplement for detailed analyses), data from the two stress groups were combined into a  14	 ﾠ
single ‘stress’ group in subsequent analyses.  15	 ﾠ
  16	 ﾠ
  17	 ﾠ
Procedures  18	 ﾠ
  Figure  1  presents  a  summary  of  the  session  timeline.    After  arriving  to  the  19	 ﾠ
laboratory, the first written informed consent was obtained using a general consent form  20	 ﾠ
with  no  mention  of  the  stress  manipulation.    This  procedure  allowed  us  to  obtain  21	 ﾠ
unbiased baseline self-report ratings and physiological indices.  Participants were then  22	 ﾠ
asked to complete a battery of self-report questionnaires, including a demographics form,  23	 ﾠ
the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, and Brown, 1996), the Mood and  24	 ﾠ
Anxiety  Symptom  Questionnaire  (MASQ-short;  Watson  et  al.,  1995),  the  Perceived  25	 ﾠ
Stress  Scale  (PSS;  Cohen  et  al.,  1983),  the  Temporal  Experience  of  Pleasure  Scale  26	 ﾠ
(TEPS;  Gard  et  al.,  2006),  and  the  Behavioral  Inhibition  and  Behavioral  Activation  27	 ﾠ
Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994).  28	 ﾠ
Twenty minutes after arrival, the first of three saliva samples was collected to  29	 ﾠ
measure baseline cortisol levels.  Next, participants completed the first set of “in-the- 30	 ﾠ
moment” state self-report questionnaires to obtain baseline ratings of their current mood  31	 ﾠ
(= “baseline” timepoint for analyses).  These included the state versions of the State Trait  32	 ﾠ
Anxiety  Inventory  (STAI-S;  Spielberger  et  al.,  1983)  and  the  Positive  and  Negative  33	 ﾠ
Affect Schedule (PANAS-S; Watson et al., 1988).    34	 ﾠ
Next, the second written informed consent was obtained using either a ‘no stress’  35	 ﾠ
condition or a ‘stress’ condition consent form.  The ‘stress’ consent form stated that  36	 ﾠ
participants might receive electrical shocks (via two electrodes attached to their right  37	 ﾠ
hand) during two ensuing computer games: “up to two” shocks during the first task (a  38	 ﾠ
“filler” task) and “up to three” shocks during the second task (the PSST).  Participants  39	 ﾠ
then completed a computerized basic attention task that acted as a “filler” task, during  40	 ﾠ
which all participants in the ‘stress’ condition received one electrical shock (performance  41	 ﾠ
in this task was extraneous to study hypotheses).  This task served the purpose of making  42	 ﾠ
the potential for shock a credible threat given that we did not actually administer any  43	 ﾠ
shock during the main task of interest (PSST).  Following the “filler” task, participants  44	 ﾠ
completed a second identical set of “in-the-moment” state self-report questionnaires (=  45	 ﾠ
“post-filler-task/pre-PSST” timepoint); additionally, participants were asked to provide a  46	 ﾠ 
second  saliva  sample  for  cortisol  level  analyses  (approximately  13  minutes  after  the  1	 ﾠ
shock).    2	 ﾠ
  Thereafter, participants who completed the “filler” task in the ‘stress’ condition  3	 ﾠ
were further subdivided into ‘controllable stress’ and ‘uncontrollable stress’ conditions,  4	 ﾠ
and participants received the appropriate set of instructions for the PSST.  Between the  5	 ﾠ
training  and  test  phases  of  the  PSST,  participants  completed  a  third  set  of  “in-the- 6	 ﾠ
moment”  state  self-report  questionnaires  (=  “PSST”  timepoint)  probing  affect  7	 ﾠ
experienced during the training phase of the task (i.e., the phase of the task involving the  8	 ﾠ
stress manipulation).  Following the test phase of the PSST, participants were asked to  9	 ﾠ
provide a third saliva sample for cortisol analyses (time-locked to 10 minutes from the  10	 ﾠ
end of the training phase of the PSST in order to capture cortisol levels when participants  11	 ﾠ
in the stress conditions were under perceived ‘threat of shock’).  Then, they completed a  12	 ﾠ
final set of “in-the-moment” state self-report questionnaires (= “post-task” timepoint).   13	 ﾠ
Participants also completed a post-task questionnaire to probe their experiences during  14	 ﾠ
the session.  At the end of the experiment, all participants were debriefed and either paid  15	 ﾠ
($10/hour) or awarded study credit for their time.  The overall session took approximately  16	 ﾠ
1.5  to  2  hours,  and  subjects  received  $15-$20  or  1.5-2  study  credits.    Please  see  17	 ﾠ
Supplement for detailed descriptions of trait and state measures.  18	 ﾠ
  19	 ﾠ
Stress manipulation    20	 ﾠ
Two electrodes were placed on the right hand of each participant assigned to  21	 ﾠ
either of the stress conditions, and the electrode wires were attached to a shock box  22	 ﾠ
placed on the table in front of the participant.  The shock level was adjusted to what each  23	 ﾠ
participant felt was “aversive, but not painful.”  This was done by beginning at the lowest  24	 ﾠ
level of shock intensity and having the participant experience a brief shock at each level  25	 ﾠ
to have the participant identify a level that she felt was “aversive, but not painful.”  The  26	 ﾠ
maximum current intensity (4 mA; Coulbourn E13-22) was approved by the local IRB.   27	 ﾠ
Prior to the “filler” task, these participants were told that they could receive up to two  28	 ﾠ
electrical shocks, but the task was actually programmed to administer only one shock.  In  29	 ﾠ
the PSST, all participants were told that they would see a multicolored bar on either side  30	 ﾠ
of the computer screen with a tick mark that would periodically move up and down.  In  31	 ﾠ
the ‘no stress’ condition, they were told that the bars had no meaning.  They were also  32	 ﾠ
told that occasionally the border of the computer screen would flash red and they should  33	 ﾠ
press down on a foot pedal when they saw this visual cue in order to indicate that they  34	 ﾠ
were attending to the task.  The task was programmed for the cue to appear 1 - 2 times  35	 ﾠ
during  each  practice  block,  but  participants  were  not  given  information  about  the  36	 ﾠ
frequency  of  this  occurrence.    For  participants  in  both  the  ‘controllable  stress’  and  37	 ﾠ
‘uncontrollable stress’ conditions, the border flashing red indicated that a shock might  38	 ﾠ
occur in the next 15-30 seconds and they were told that the location of the tick mark  39	 ﾠ
within the multicolored bars would indicate the likelihood they would receive a shock.   40	 ﾠ
For these participants, the multicolored bars were labeled with “danger” at the top and  41	 ﾠ
“safe” at the bottom, and the closer the tick mark was to the top of the bar, the higher the  42	 ﾠ
likelihood of receiving a shock.  Moreover, participants in the stress conditions were told  43	 ﾠ
that  the  movement  of  the  tick  mark  was  determined  by  the  computer  and  was  thus  44	 ﾠ
unrelated to their performance on the task.  However, participants in the ‘controllable  45	 ﾠ
stress’ condition were told that if they pressed the foot pedal when they saw the red  46	 ﾠ 
border visual cue, they could override the computer and lower the location of the tick  1	 ﾠ
mark in the bars, thus reducing (albeit not fully eliminating) the likelihood they would  2	 ﾠ
receive a shock.  When these participants pressed down on the foot pedal, the tick mark  3	 ﾠ
did shift down closer to the “safe” zone at the bottom of the bar, providing some visual  4	 ﾠ
feedback.  In contrast, participants in the ‘uncontrollable stress’ condition were instructed  5	 ﾠ
to press down on the foot pedal to indicate they were attending to the task (i.e., they  6	 ﾠ
received the same instructions about the foot pedal as those in the ‘no stress’ condition)  7	 ﾠ
and  this  had  no  effect  on  the  location  of  the  tick  mark.    Participants  in  both  stress  8	 ﾠ
conditions were told they could receive up to three electrical shocks during the PSST; in  9	 ﾠ
reality, no shock was administered during this task.  Of note, the threat-of-shock stress  10	 ﾠ
manipulation was only in effect during the training phase of the PSST.  This was the  11	 ﾠ
target of our stress manipulation because reward and punishment feedback were only  12	 ﾠ
provided during that phase of the task.  13	 ﾠ
  14	 ﾠ
“Filler” task  15	 ﾠ
Participants  completed  a  brief  version  (~8  min)  of  a  Continuous  Performance  16	 ﾠ
Task (CPT; Conners, 1995) as a “filler” task.  They were presented with a series of letters  17	 ﾠ
(“O,” “T,” “H,” “Z,” or “X”) on a computer screen, one at a time, and were instructed to  18	 ﾠ
press  the  space  bar  immediately  following  any  letter  except  for  “X.”    Participants  19	 ﾠ
completed two blocks of 125 trials, with each letter appearing in 25 trials; on each trial,  20	 ﾠ
the letter stimulus was presented for 500 ms, followed by an interstimulus interval that  21	 ﾠ
varied between 1250-1550 ms.    22	 ﾠ
  23	 ﾠ
Modified Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task (PSST)  24	 ﾠ
The PSST included a training phase and a test phase (Figure 2).  During the  25	 ﾠ
training phase, participants were presented with three different stimuli pairs (AB, CD,  26	 ﾠ
EF) in random order, and were instructed to choose one of the two stimuli by pressing  27	 ﾠ
one of two response buttons.  Following a subject’s response, feedback was given to  28	 ﾠ
indicate whether the choice was “correct” or “incorrect.”  Importantly, this feedback was  29	 ﾠ
probabilistic, such that for AB trials, a choice of stimulus A led to correct (positive)  30	 ﾠ
feedback in 80% of the trials, while a choice of stimulus B led to incorrect (negative)  31	 ﾠ
feedback in these trials (with the relations reversed for the other 20% of AB trials).  The  32	 ﾠ
stimulus pair CD was less reliable, with stimulus C correct in 70% of CD trials, and the  33	 ﾠ
stimulus pair EF was the least reliable, with stimulus E correct in 60% of the EF trials.   34	 ﾠ
During  this  training  phase,  subjects  learned  to  choose  stimuli  A,  C,  and  E  more  35	 ﾠ
frequently than B, D, or F.  Of note, selection of A over B could be achieved either by  36	 ﾠ
learning that choosing A usually leads to positive feedback or learning that choosing B  37	 ﾠ
usually leads to negative feedback, or both.  Participants completed the training phase  38	 ﾠ
either under a ‘no stress,’ ‘controllable stress,’ or ‘uncontrollable stress’ condition.  The  39	 ﾠ
training phase was terminated after participants reached performance criteria (65% A in  40	 ﾠ
AB,  60%  C  in  CD,  and  50%  E  in  EF)  or  after  the  completion  of  6  blocks.    The  41	 ﾠ
performance criteria were set so that all participants would be at approximately the same  42	 ﾠ
performance level before proceeding to the test phase (i.e., there was no ‘overtraining’ for  43	 ﾠ
subjects who had already learned the contingencies because they would advance to the  44	 ﾠ
test phase earlier).    45	 ﾠ 
In the test phase, subjects were presented with the same three stimuli pairs, as  1	 ﾠ
well as all novel combinations of stimuli pairs, and feedback was not provided (Figure 2).   2	 ﾠ
In  order  to  examine  whether  subjects  learned  more  about  the  positive  or  negative  3	 ﾠ
outcomes of their decisions in the training phase, the stimuli pairs of primary interest in  4	 ﾠ
the test phase were those involving an A or B stimulus paired with a novel stimulus (e.g.,  5	 ﾠ
AC, AD, AE, and AF; BC, BD, BE, and BF), referred to as “transfer pairs.”  These  6	 ﾠ
transfer pairs enabled assessment of the degree to which participants learned from prior  7	 ﾠ
positive feedback to choose the most reinforced stimulus (“Choose A”) and/or learned  8	 ﾠ
from prior negative feedback to avoid the most punished stimulus (“Avoid B”).  Prior  9	 ﾠ
studies  have  shown  that  these  conditions  are  differentially  sensitive  to  dopaminergic  10	 ﾠ
manipulation and that performance in the “Choose A” condition is correlated with neural  11	 ﾠ
responses  to  positive  outcomes,  whereas  performance  in  the  “Avoid  B”  condition  is  12	 ﾠ
correlated with neural responses to negative outcomes.   13	 ﾠ
The stimuli presented in the PSST were black-and-white Hiragana characters.  In  14	 ﾠ
the training phase, each trial began with a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for  15	 ﾠ
1000 ms, followed by a stimuli pair for 2000 ms or until the participant made a response.   16	 ﾠ
Thereafter, visual feedback was provided for 1500 ms as either “Correct” in blue letters,  17	 ﾠ
“Incorrect” in red letters, or “No response detected” in red letters (if the subject did not  18	 ﾠ
respond within 2000 ms).  Each block of the training phase had 60 trials with 20 trials per  19	 ﾠ
stimuli  pair.    In  the  test  phase,  each  trial  began  with  a  fixation  cross  for  1000  ms,  20	 ﾠ
followed by a stimuli pair for 3000 ms or until the participant made a response.  The test  21	 ﾠ
phase  consisted  of  one  block  of  90  trials,  with  six  trials  of  each  of  the  15  possible  22	 ﾠ
stimulus pairs.  23	 ﾠ
  24	 ﾠ
Saliva samples  25	 ﾠ
For  saliva  collection,  participants  were  instructed  to  put  a  small  cotton  roll  26	 ﾠ
(Salivette) in their mouth for approximately 90 seconds, and then place the saliva-soaked  27	 ﾠ
cotton into a small plastic tube.  Saliva samples were subsequently stored in a freezer  28	 ﾠ
(≤ -20 degrees Celsius) until assayed.  The timing of the collection of cortisol samples  29	 ﾠ
(specified in the procedures section above) was based on prior research indicating that  30	 ﾠ
cortisol typically peaks about 10-20 minutes after stressor onset (e.g., Kudielka, Buske- 31	 ﾠ
Kirschbaum,  Hellhammer,  &  Kirschbaum,  2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo  control  for  diurnal  rhythms  in  32	 ﾠ
cortisol levels, all participants were run between the hours of 1pm and 6pm (Dickerson  33	 ﾠ
and Kemeny, 2004).  To further control for fluctuations in hormone levels, participants  34	 ﾠ
were asked to adhere to the following instructions: no eating or brushing their teeth for at  35	 ﾠ
least an hour before the session; no consumption of yogurt for at least two hours before  36	 ﾠ
the session; no consumption of any caffeine-containing products or alcohol the day of the  37	 ﾠ
session; no strenuous exercise the day of the session.  Information was also collected  38	 ﾠ
regarding the time of day participants woke up and the time of the session.   39	 ﾠ
  40	 ﾠ
Data Analyses  41	 ﾠ
  42	 ﾠ
Trait and dispositional self-report measures   43	 ﾠ
Total and subscale scores were computed for the BDI, MASQ, PSS, TEPS, and  44	 ﾠ
BIS/BAS, and t-tests were run to compare participants who completed the task under  45	 ﾠ
‘stress’ versus ‘no-stress’ conditions.   46	 ﾠ 
  1	 ﾠ
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures   2	 ﾠ
To assess the effectiveness of the stress manipulation, separate mixed ANOVAs  3	 ﾠ
were  conducted  on  STAI-S,  PANAS-PA  (positive  affect),  and  PANAS-NA  (negative  4	 ﾠ
affect) scores, with Time (Baseline, PSST) as a repeated measure and Group (Stress, No- 5	 ﾠ
Stress) as a between-subjects factor.  Significant findings were followed up with t-tests.    6	 ﾠ
  7	 ﾠ
PSST training phase  8	 ﾠ
To  evaluate  potential  group  differences  in  training,  t-tests  were  conducted  to  9	 ﾠ
compare groups on the number of blocks required to reach performance criteria; separate  10	 ﾠ
mixed ANOVAs were run for accuracy and RT on the final training block with Trial  11	 ﾠ
Type (AB, CD, EF) and Group as factors.  Significant differences were followed up with  12	 ﾠ
t-tests.    13	 ﾠ
  14	 ﾠ
PSST test phase  15	 ﾠ
Prior to the main analyses of interest, a t-test was run to compare accuracy on AB  16	 ﾠ
trials (the “easiest” trial type) in the test phase to confirm that there were no significant  17	 ﾠ
differences between ‘stress’ and ‘no stress’ groups with regard to participants learning the  18	 ﾠ
basic  task.    Although  the  performance  criteria  in  the  training  phase  was  intended  to  19	 ﾠ
address this issue, it is possible that participants could have become confused by the lack  20	 ﾠ
of feedback and the addition of novel stimuli pairs in the test phase, so this served to  21	 ﾠ
verify that learning carried over to the test phase.    22	 ﾠ
Thereafter,  to  assess  whether  participants  learned  more  from  the  positive  or  23	 ﾠ
negative feedback they received during training, data from the test phase were analyzed  24	 ﾠ
with respect to performance on the test trials involving novel combinations of stimuli  25	 ﾠ
pairs that included either an A or a B stimulus, respectively.  For trials involving an A  26	 ﾠ
stimulus paired with a novel stimulus (“Choose A” trials), accuracy was calculated as the  27	 ﾠ
proportion of trials on which the participant chose A (the most frequently reinforced  28	 ﾠ
stimulus) over the novel stimulus.  For trials involving a B stimulus paired with a novel  29	 ﾠ
stimulus (“Avoid B” trials), accuracy was calculated as the proportion of trials on which  30	 ﾠ
the participant avoided B (the most frequently punished stimulus) and chose the novel  31	 ﾠ
stimulus instead.  Next, ANOVAs were performed with Trial Type (‘Choose A,’ ‘Avoid  32	 ﾠ
B’) and Group as factors to examine accuracy and RT separately.  Significant differences  33	 ﾠ
were followed up with the appropriate t-tests.  34	 ﾠ
  35	 ﾠ
Saliva samples (cortisol)   36	 ﾠ
In order to obtain cortisol levels, saliva samples were sent to the Laboratory for  37	 ﾠ
Biological Health Psychology (Brandeis University, MA, USA) and analyzed in a single  38	 ﾠ
batch  to  avoid  essay  variability  (intra-assay  CV  =  6.48%;  inter-assay  CV  =  6.06%).   39	 ﾠ
These values were then entered into an ANOVA using Time (T1 = baseline, T2 = post- 40	 ﾠ
“filler” task/pre-PSST, T3 = post-PSST) and Group as factors.  Given the diurnal drop in  41	 ﾠ
cortisol levels throughout the day (Schmidt-Reinwald et al., 1999), and the inevitable  42	 ﾠ
variability in wake-up time across participants, we also calculated the difference between  43	 ﾠ
waking time and time of the first saliva collection; this value was used as a covariate in  44	 ﾠ
the aforementioned ANOVA.  Next, in line with previous studies (e.g., Townsend et al.,  45	 ﾠ
2011), we calculated cortisol reactivity scores (i.e., difference scores from T1 to T2, or  46	 ﾠ 
T1 to T3) for all participants.  Finally, an ANOVA was run to compare cortisol reactivity  1	 ﾠ
scores with Group.    2	 ﾠ
  3	 ﾠ
Follow-up analyses: Using changes in cortisol levels and self-reported state anxiety to  4	 ﾠ
identify stress-reactive subgroup    5	 ﾠ
Given that ‘threat of shock’ might only have been stressful for a sub-group of  6	 ﾠ
participants, we identified individuals who were relatively high stress responders based  7	 ﾠ
on changes in cortisol levels and self-reported state anxiety from T1 (baseline) to T2 (~13  8	 ﾠ
minutes after subjects received the shock administered in the “filler” task).  Initially, we  9	 ﾠ
examined descriptive statistics on the distribution of cortisol reactivity scores from T2 –  10	 ﾠ
T1 within ‘no-stress’ and ‘stress’ groups to examine if there was indeed considerable  11	 ﾠ
variability  in  reactivity  scores  within  each  group.    In  order  to  obtain  a  new  ‘stress  12	 ﾠ
reactive’ group with only stress-reactive participants, we first standardized the T2 – T1  13	 ﾠ
cortisol reactivity scores across all participants.  Next, using these standardized values,  14	 ﾠ
participants  were  divided  into  3  tiers:  high  responders  (>  0.24),  medium  responders  15	 ﾠ
(-0.27 ≥ and ≤ 0.24), and low responders (< -0.27).  These cut-off scores were selected so  16	 ﾠ
that approximately 1/3 of participants were in each tier.  Similarly, we standardized the  17	 ﾠ
T2 - T1 change scores in self-reported state anxiety levels (using STAI scores), and again  18	 ﾠ
divided participants into 3 tiers: high responders (> 0.44), medium responders (-0.66 ≥  19	 ﾠ
and ≤ 0.44), and low responders (< -0.66). Thereafter, a new ‘stress reactive’ group was  20	 ﾠ
created that included only participants who completed the task under stress and were  21	 ﾠ
relatively high stress responders, defined as being in the ‘high responder’ tier with regard  22	 ﾠ
to both changes in cortisol levels and self-reported state anxiety.  Using this new ‘stress  23	 ﾠ
reactive’ group, all of the aforementioned analyses were re-run to compare the ‘stress  24	 ﾠ
reactive’ and ‘no-stress’ groups on demographics, trait and state self-report measures, and  25	 ﾠ
performance on the PSST task.    26	 ﾠ
  27	 ﾠ
  28	 ﾠ
RESULTS  29	 ﾠ
  30	 ﾠ
Trait and dispositional self-report measures (No-Stress vs. Stress Groups)  31	 ﾠ
  As evident in Table 1, there were no significant differences between the ‘no- 32	 ﾠ
stress’ and ‘stress’ groups on the trait or dispositional self-report measures collected at  33	 ﾠ
baseline  [all  ts  ≤  1.67,  ps  ≥  0.10].    Accordingly,  putative  differences  in  behavioral  34	 ﾠ
performance or stress reactivity were not confounded by group differences in trait or  35	 ﾠ
dispositional affect, or ongoing stress levels.  36	 ﾠ
  37	 ﾠ
38	 ﾠ 
Table 1:  1	 ﾠ
  
No 
Stress 
(NS) 
Group 
Stress 
(S) 
Group 
Stress 
Reactive 
(SR) 
Group 
 
 
NS v. S 
Statistic 
 
 
 
p 
NS v. SR 
Statistic  p 
Gender 
(% female)  100%  100%  100%  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Age 
(years) 
21.43 
(± 1.79) 
21.32  
(± 2.20) 
22.05  
(± 1.92)  t(93) = 0.22  0.83  t(43) = 1.11  0.28 
Education 
(years) 
14.81 
(± 1.39) 
14.35  
(± 1.61) 
14.94  
(± 1.35)  t(93) = 1.31  0.19  t(43) = 0.31  0.76 
Marital Status           
(% single)  100%  93%  89%  χ
2(2) = 2.10  0.35  χ
2(1) = 3.14  0.08 
Income*                       
(% < $50,000)  90%  74%  69%  χ
2(1) = 2.29  0.13  χ
2(1) = 2.29  0.13 
Compensation     
Form 
(% monetary) 
85%  90%  78%  χ
2(1) = 0.39  0.54  χ
2(1) = 0.41  0.52 
Ethnicity                    
(% Caucasian)  85%  59%  61%  χ
2(2) =10.07  0.01  χ
2(1) = 3.39  0.07 
BDI-II   1.85 
(± 2.38) 
2.21 
(± 2.34) 
1.67  
(± 2.03)  t(93) = -0.66  0.51  t(43) = 0.27  0.79 
MASQ: GDA  15.52 
(± 4.74) 
15.66 
(± 3.90) 
16.22  
(± 3.21)  t(93) = -0.15  0.88  t(43) = -0.55  0.59 
MASQ: GDD  16.85 
(± 5.25) 
18.10 
(± 5.12) 
17.72  
(± 5.79)  t(93) = -1.07  0.29  t(43) = -0.52  0.60 
MASQ: AA  20.52 
(± 4.82) 
19.59 
(± 3.62) 
19.28  
(± 3.05)  t(93) = 1.03  0.31  t(43) = 0.97  0.34 
MASQ: AD  49.56 
(± 10.90) 
49.71 
(± 10.68) 
45.83  
(± 8.99)  t(93) = -0.06  0.95  t(43) = 1.20  0.24 
Perceived 
Stress Scale 
19.67 
(± 6.33) 
20.68 
(± 5.86) 
20.83  
(± 4.62)  t(93) = -0.74  0.46  t(43) = -0.67  0.51 
TEPS: 
Anticipatory 
64.67 
(± 6.68) 
64.65 
(± 9.78) 
66.11  
(± 7.80)   t(93) = 0.01  0.99  t(43) = -0.67  0.51 
TEPS: 
Consummatory 
48.41 
(± 5.56) 
50.66 
(± 6.06) 
52.22  
(± 5.70)  t(93) = -1.67  0.10  t(43) = -2.23  0.03 
BIS/BAS: 
Reward 
Responsiveness 
7.48 
(± 1.67) 
7.51 
(± 2.18) 
7.56  
(± 2.09)  t(93) = -0.07  0.94  t(43) = -0.13  0.90 
BIS/BAS: 
Drive 
9.19 
(± 1.96) 
9.06 
(± 2.13) 
9.06  
(± 1.73)  t(93) = 0.27  0.79  t(43) = 0.23  0.82 
BIS/BAS: 
Fun Seeking 
8.04 
(± 2.16) 
7.78 
(± 2.23) 
8.00  
(± 2.47)  t(93) = 0.51  0.61  t(43) = 0.05  0.96 
BIS/BAS: 
Inhibition 
16.00 
(± 2.82) 
15.40 
(± 2.83) 
15.33  
(± 2.74)  t(93) = 0.94  0.35  t(43) = 0.79  0.44 
BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; GDA = General  2	 ﾠ
Distress Anxious; GDD = General Distress Depressive; AA = Anxious Arousal; AD = Anhedonic Depression; TEPS = Temporal  3	 ﾠ
Experience of Pleasure Scale; BIS/BAS = Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales  4	 ﾠ
* = Participants who chose not to report income are not included in the Income statistics; this applies to 7 out of 27 (26%) ‘no stress’  5	 ﾠ
participants and 15 out of 68 (22%) ‘stress’ participants.  6	 ﾠ
  7	 ﾠ 
  1	 ﾠ
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures (No-Stress v. Stress Groups)  2	 ﾠ
  Analyses of both state anxiety (STAI-S scores) and negative affect (PANAS-NA  3	 ﾠ
scores) revealed similar effects: significant Time x Group interactions [Fs(1,93) > 5.06,  4	 ﾠ
ps < 0.03], along with significant main effects of Time [Fs(1,93) > 8.80, ps < 0.01] and  5	 ﾠ
Group [Fs(1,93) > 4.87, ps ≤ 0.03].  Importantly, at baseline, groups did not differ in their  6	 ﾠ
levels of state anxiety or negative affect [ts(93) < 0.46, ps > 0.64].  During the PSST,  7	 ﾠ
participants in the ‘stress’ group reported significantly higher levels of state anxiety and  8	 ﾠ
negative  affect  than  participants  in  the  ‘no-stress’  group  [ts(93)  >  3.00,  p  <  0.01].   9	 ﾠ
Within-group paired t-tests indicated that anxiety increased from baseline to PSST in the  10	 ﾠ
‘no stress’ group [t(26) = 2.17, p = 0.04] and, to a much greater degree, in the ‘stress’  11	 ﾠ
group [t(67) = 8.54, p < 0.01].  Meanwhile, negative affect increased significantly from  12	 ﾠ
baseline to PSST in the ‘stress’ group [t(67) = 4.45, p < 0.01] but not in the ‘no stress’  13	 ﾠ
group [t(26) = 0.62, p = 0.54].   The mixed ANOVA on PANAS-PA scores revealed only  14	 ﾠ
a significant main effect of Time [F(1,93) = 11.33, p < 0.01; all other Fs < 2.58, ps >  15	 ﾠ
0.11], with levels of positive affect decreasing from baseline to PSST in both groups.   16	 ﾠ
    17	 ﾠ
PSST training phase (No-Stress v. Stress Groups)  18	 ﾠ
  Groups did not differ in the number of completed training blocks [t(93) = 0.27, p  19	 ﾠ
= 0.79]; all groups took approximately 3 blocks to advance to the test phase [No-Stress:  20	 ﾠ
3.15 ± 1.75; Stress: 3.25 ± 1.62].  A Trial Type (AB, CD, EF) x Group (‘no stress,’  21	 ﾠ
‘stress’) mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores in the final training block indicated only a  22	 ﾠ
significant main effect of Trial Type [F(1,93)=24.71, p < 0.01; all other Fs < 2.41, ps >  23	 ﾠ
0.12]; as expected, participants were most accurate on the AB trial type and least accurate  24	 ﾠ
on the EF trial type.  No significant differences emerged from the mixed ANOVA for RT  25	 ﾠ
in the final training block [all Fs < 1.06, ps > 0.30].  Altogether, these findings indicate  26	 ﾠ
that (1) the probabilistic contingencies elicited the intended behavioral effects, and (2)  27	 ﾠ
groups did not differ in performance during the training phase.  28	 ﾠ
  29	 ﾠ
PSST test phase (No-Stress v. Stress Groups)  30	 ﾠ
The groups did not differ significantly in their accuracy on AB trials in the test  31	 ﾠ
phase [No-Stress Group = 90% (± 12%); Stress Group = 86% (± 23%); [t(93)= 0.94, p =  32	 ﾠ
0.35], confirming that learning carried over to the test phase similarly for the two groups.   33	 ﾠ
Contrary to hypotheses, the Trial Type (“Choose A,” “Avoid B”) x Group ANOVA on  34	 ﾠ
accuracy scores revealed no significant effects [all Fs < 1.82, ps > 0.17].  35	 ﾠ
 For RT scores, the analogous Trial Type x Group ANOVA yielded a significant  36	 ﾠ
main effect of Trial Type [F(1,93) = 29.52, p < 0.01] and a trend for a Trial Type x Group  37	 ﾠ
interaction [F(1,93) = 3.29, p = 0.07].  These results reflected both groups being faster on  38	 ﾠ
“Choose A” trials than “Avoid B” trials, with the ‘no-stress’ group demonstrating this  39	 ﾠ
pattern to a greater extent.   40	 ﾠ
  41	 ﾠ
Stress-reactive  subgroup  (defined  by  changes  in  cortisol  levels  and  self-reported  42	 ﾠ
state anxiety)   43	 ﾠ
  An examination of descriptive statistics on the distribution of cortisol reactivity  44	 ﾠ
scores at T2-T1 within ‘no-stress’ and ‘stress’ groups revealed considerable variability in  45	 ﾠ
reactivity scores within each group: scores in the ‘no stress’ group ranged from -5.51 to  46	 ﾠ 
1.71 [mean: -1.56 ± 1.57]; scores in the ‘stress’ group ranged from -7.82 to 11.78 [mean:  1	 ﾠ
-0.95 ± 2.40].  Per design, cortisol reactivity scores at T2-T1 were significantly higher in  2	 ﾠ
the new ‘stress reactive’ group than the ‘no-stress’ group [t(42) = 4.01, p < 0.01; degrees  3	 ﾠ
of  freedom  reduced  by  1  because  cortisol  data  missing  for  one  subject  at  T2].   4	 ﾠ
Importantly, cortisol reactivity scores at T3-T1 continued to be significantly higher in the  5	 ﾠ
‘stress reactive’ group than the ‘no-stress’ group [t(41) = 3.75, p < 0.01; degrees of  6	 ﾠ
freedom reduced by 2 because cortisol data missing for two subjects at T3], suggesting  7	 ﾠ
that subjects in the ‘stress reactive’ group continued to be more physiologically stressed  8	 ﾠ
during the PSST than subjects in the ‘no stress’ group.  The new groups did not differ  9	 ﾠ
significantly from each other on any of the following demographic variables: gender, age,  10	 ﾠ
years of education, marital status, income level, form of compensation, or ethnicity (see  11	 ﾠ
Table 1).   12	 ﾠ
   13	 ﾠ
Trait and dispositional self-report measures (No-Stress v. Stress-Reactive Groups)   14	 ﾠ
  As  compared  to  the  ‘no-stress’  group,  the  ‘stress  reactive’  group  reported  15	 ﾠ
significantly higher scores on the consummatory subscale of the Temporal Experiences  16	 ﾠ
of Pleasure Scale (TEPS), which assesses individual trait dispositions in consummatory  17	 ﾠ
experiences of pleasure [t(43) = 2.23, p = 0.03; all other ts(43) ≤ 1.36, ps ≥ 0.18].  Due to  18	 ﾠ
this finding, the TEPS consummatory subscore was used as a covariate.    19	 ﾠ
  20	 ﾠ
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures (No-Stress v. Stress-Reactive Groups)  21	 ﾠ
  State anxiety. As shown in Figure 3, and in line with the new group design, the  22	 ﾠ
ANCOVA  on  STAI-S  scores  revealed  only  a  significant  Time  x  Group  interaction  23	 ﾠ
[F(1,42) = 13.33, p < 0.01], whereas the Time [F(1,42) = 0.29, p = 0.59] and Group  24	 ﾠ
[F(1,42) = 3.52, p = 0.07] effects were not significant.  At baseline, groups did not differ  25	 ﾠ
in their state anxiety levels [t(43) = -0.48, p = 0.63].  During the PSST, participants in the  26	 ﾠ
‘stress  reactive’  group  reported  significantly  higher  levels  of  state  anxiety  than  27	 ﾠ
participants in the ‘no-stress’ group [t(43) = 3.57, p < 0.01]. Within-group paired t-tests  28	 ﾠ
indicated that anxiety increased from baseline to PSST in both the ‘stress reactive’ group  29	 ﾠ
[t(17) = 6.31, p < 0.01] and ‘no stress’ group [t(26) = 2.17, p = 0.04].   30	 ﾠ
  State  negative  affect.  The  ANCOVA  on  PANAS-NA  scores  indicated  only  a  31	 ﾠ
significant Time x Group interaction [F(1,42) = 6.00, p = 0.02]; Time [F(1,42) = 0.95, p =  32	 ﾠ
0.33] and Group [F(1,42) = 3.57, p = 0.07]; see Figure 3.  At baseline, groups did not  33	 ﾠ
differ in their levels of negative affect [t(43) = -0.12, p = 0.90]; during the PSST, the  34	 ﾠ
‘stress reactive’ group reported significantly more negative affect than the ‘no stress’  35	 ﾠ
group [t(43) = 2.90, p < 0.01].  Paired t-tests indicated that negative affect increased  36	 ﾠ
significantly from baseline to PSST in the ‘stress reactive’ group [t(17) = 3.03, p < 0.01],  37	 ﾠ
but not in the ‘no stress’ group [t(26) = 0.62, p = 0.54].  38	 ﾠ
  State positive affect. The ANCOVA revealed no significant effects [all Fs < 1.95,  39	 ﾠ
ps > 0.17].   40	 ﾠ
    41	 ﾠ
PSST training phase (No-Stress v. Stress-Reactive Groups)  42	 ﾠ
  Groups did not differ in the number of completed training blocks [t(43) = 0.57, p  43	 ﾠ
= 0.58]; all groups took approximately 3 blocks to advance to the test phase [No-Stress:  44	 ﾠ
3.15 ± 1.75; Stress-Reactive: 3.44 ± 1.69].  Separate Trial Type (AB, CD, EF) x Group  45	 ﾠ 
(‘no stress,’ ‘stress reactive’) ANCOVA on accuracy scores and RT scores revealed no  1	 ﾠ
significant effects [all Fs <3.13, all ps > 0.08].  2	 ﾠ
  3	 ﾠ
PSST test phase (No-Stress v. Stress-Reactive Groups)  4	 ﾠ
  The ANCOVA comparing accuracy on AB trials in the test phase with Group  5	 ﾠ
(‘no stress,’ ‘stress reactive’) revealed no significant group differences [No-Stress Group  6	 ﾠ
= 90% (± 12%); Stress-Reactive Group = 92% (± 16%); [F(1,42) = 0.63, p = 0.43],  7	 ﾠ
confirming  that  learning  carried  over  to  the  test  phase  similarly  for  the  two  groups.   8	 ﾠ
Critically, the Trial Type (“Choose A,” “Avoid B”) x Group (‘no stress,’ ‘stress reactive’)  9	 ﾠ
ANCOVA on accuracy scores revealed a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,42) = 5.72, p =  10	 ﾠ
0.02], which was qualified by a significant Group x Trial Type interaction [F(1,42) =  11	 ﾠ
6.45, p = 0.015], whereas the Group main effect was not significant [F(1,42) = 0.14, p =  12	 ﾠ
0.71].  As shown in Figure 4, these findings indicate that the ‘stress reactive’ group  13	 ﾠ
displayed relatively lower accuracy on reward-related trials than punishment-related trials  14	 ﾠ
compared to the ‘no stress’ group, which exhibited the opposite pattern.   15	 ﾠ
For RT, an analogous Group x Trial Type ANCOVA yielded only a significant  16	 ﾠ
main effect of Group [F(1,42) = 7.59, p < 0.01;  all other ps > 0.18], due to faster RTs in  17	 ﾠ
the ‘no-stress’ group than the ‘stress reactive’ group (Figure 4).  Follow-up analyses  18	 ﾠ
indicated  that,  compared  to  the  ‘no  stress’  group,  participants  in  the  ‘stress  reactive’  19	 ﾠ
group demonstrated significantly slower RTs on the “Choose A” trials [F(1,42) = 13.67,  20	 ﾠ
p < 0.01], but not the “Avoid B” trials [F(1,42) = 3.13, p = 0.08].  Moreover, participants  21	 ﾠ
within the ‘no stress’ group were faster on their “Choose A” trials than their “Avoid B”  22	 ﾠ
trials [t(26) = -4.47, p < 0.01], suggestive of a reward-related RT bias, whereas those in  23	 ﾠ
the ‘stress reactive’ group had similar RTs on both trial types [t(17) = -1.41, p = 0.18]  24	 ﾠ
and did not show this effect.    25	 ﾠ
  26	 ﾠ
DISCUSSION  27	 ﾠ
    28	 ﾠ
  This study was designed to extend our understanding of stress-related anhedonic  29	 ﾠ
behavior  by  examining  whether  stress  specifically  reduces  reward  processing  (i.e.,  30	 ﾠ
learning from positive feedback) or more generally influences incentive processing (i.e.,  31	 ﾠ
learning from both positive and negative feedback).  The stress manipulation induced  32	 ﾠ
significantly  higher  levels  of  negative  affect  and  anxiety  in  those  individuals  who  33	 ﾠ
completed  the  Probabilistic  Stimulus  Selection  Task  under  stress  versus  no-stress  34	 ﾠ
conditions.  Yet,  contrary  to  our  hypotheses,  the  stress  manipulation  did  not  have  a  35	 ﾠ
significant  differential  impact  on  cortisol  reactivity  or  task  performance  at  the  group  36	 ﾠ
level, likely due to large individual differences.  Importantly, however, individuals with  37	 ﾠ
heightened cortisol reactivity and increased negative affect following acute stress did  38	 ﾠ
demonstrate deficits specific to reward processing.  These latter findings suggest that, in  39	 ﾠ
highly  stress-reactive  individuals,  stress  may  selectively  result  in  reward  processing  40	 ﾠ
deficits with no reduction in punishment processing.  41	 ﾠ
  Given that the ‘threat-of-shock’ stressor did evoke significantly higher levels of  42	 ﾠ
self-reported negative affect and anxiety in the ‘stress’ group than the ‘no-stress’ group,  43	 ﾠ
which was in line with prior independent studies (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Bogdan  44	 ﾠ
et  al.,  2011),  we  were  surprised  to  find  that  the  ‘stress’  group  did  not  demonstrate  45	 ﾠ
significantly higher levels of cortisol reactivity.  In light of these patterns, it is possible  46	 ﾠ 
that our stress manipulation may not have elicited as strong of a physiological stress  1	 ﾠ
response as intended because only a single shock was administered during the “filler”  2	 ﾠ
task and none were administered during the PSST.  In addition, the stress manipulation  3	 ﾠ
did  not  include  any  social  evaluative  component,  which  has  been  shown  to  reliably  4	 ﾠ
produce  physiological  stress  responses  (Kirschbaum  et  al.,  1993).    Moreover,  for  5	 ﾠ
participants in the ‘stress’ group, the border of the computer screen flashing red during  6	 ﾠ
the PSST indicated that a shock could occur in the next 15-30 seconds; it is possible that  7	 ﾠ
this cue may have reduced the stressfulness of the ‘threat-of-shock’ by increasing the  8	 ﾠ
perceived  predictability  of  the  stressor.    In  fact,  predictable  stressors  typically  elicit  9	 ﾠ
smaller  physiological  stress  responses  and  are  experienced  as  less  aversive  than  10	 ﾠ
unpredictable stressors (Anisman and Matheson, 2005).  In light of these null cortisol  11	 ﾠ
findings, it was not entirely surprising that initial analyses of task performance across  12	 ﾠ
groups yielded no significant between-group differences during the training or test phases  13	 ﾠ
of the PSST.    14	 ﾠ
  One potential explanation for the lack of significant findings in this initial set of  15	 ﾠ
analyses may be that there was a broad range of individual differences within the group  16	 ﾠ
of  individuals  who  completed  the  task  under  stress  in  terms  of  how  physiologically  17	 ﾠ
“stressed out” participants became in response to the ‘threat-of-shock.’  An examination  18	 ﾠ
of cortisol reactivity scores within each group indeed confirmed that there was substantial  19	 ﾠ
intra-group variability. Accordingly, we conducted follow-up analyses by identifying a  20	 ﾠ
stress-reactive  subgroup  based  on  cortisol  reactivity  as  well  as  self-reported  anxiety  21	 ﾠ
levels; the new ‘stress reactive’ group included only those participants who completed the  22	 ﾠ
task under stress and were ‘high responders’ from both a physiological (cortisol levels)  23	 ﾠ
and self-reported experiential (STAI scores) perspective.  In line with these demarcations,  24	 ﾠ
the new ‘stress reactive’ group also demonstrated a significant increase in negative affect  25	 ﾠ
(PANAS-NA  scores)  that  was  not  apparent  in  the  ‘no  stress’  group,  reinforcing  26	 ﾠ
coalescence between biological measures and self-report measures of stress response.  27	 ﾠ
  28	 ﾠ
Stress-Sensitive Individuals Demonstrate Reward-Specific Impairments  29	 ﾠ
  Consistent with previous studies (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Bogdan et al.,  30	 ﾠ
2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2007), and our main hypotheses, participants in the new ‘stress  31	 ﾠ
reactive’ group demonstrated reduced reward sensitivity relative to participants in the  32	 ﾠ
‘no-stress’  group.    This  was  supported  in  the  following  ways:  First,  there  was  a  33	 ﾠ
significant Group (‘no stress,’ ‘stress reactive’) x Trial Type (“Choose A,” “Avoid B”)  34	 ﾠ
interaction for accuracy during the test phase of the PSST, which was due to relatively  35	 ﾠ
lower accuracy on reward-related (“Choose A”) trials than punishment-related (“Avoid  36	 ﾠ
B”) trials in the ‘stress reactive’ group, compared with the opposite pattern exhibited by  37	 ﾠ
the ‘no-stress’ group (i.e., relatively higher accuracy on reward-related than punishment- 38	 ﾠ
related trials).  This finding suggests that stress-sensitive participants did not experience a  39	 ﾠ
global decrease in accuracy on the task under stress, but rather a more specific reduction  40	 ﾠ
in accuracy on reward-related trials only.  This reward-processing deficit may reflect  41	 ﾠ
reduced sensitivity to positive feedback (during the training phase of the PSST), evident  42	 ﾠ
in an impaired ability to use this reward information to guide decision making in novel  43	 ﾠ
contexts (during the test phase of the PSST).  Secondly, participants in the ‘no-stress’  44	 ﾠ
group  demonstrated  a  reward-related  RT  bias  that  was  absent  in  the  ‘stress  reactive’  45	 ﾠ
group.  Specifically, the ‘no stress’ group demonstrated faster RTs on reward-related  46	 ﾠ 
trials than punishment-related trials, while the RTs of the ‘stress reactive’ group were not  1	 ﾠ
significantly different between trial types.  Moreover, participants in the ‘no-stress’ group  2	 ﾠ
were significantly faster than participants in the ‘stress reactive’ group on the reward- 3	 ﾠ
related trials but not the punishment-related trials.  Importantly, these findings suggest  4	 ﾠ
that speed-accuracy tradeoffs did not play a significant role in the present results.  For  5	 ﾠ
example, the fact that the ‘stress reactive’ group, as compared to the ‘no stress’ group,  6	 ﾠ
had poorer accuracy and slower RTs on reward-related trials runs counter to the notion  7	 ﾠ
that poorer accuracy could have been due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff of faster RTs.   8	 ﾠ
Overall, our results expand prior lines of research on stress-induced reductions in reward  9	 ﾠ
responsiveness  by  suggesting  that  stress  may  selectively  reduce  sensitivity  to  reward  10	 ﾠ
feedback and does not more broadly reduce sensitivity to feedback in general.     11	 ﾠ
  During the test phase, there were no group differences in accuracy on the most  12	 ﾠ
salient  trials  from  the  training  phase  (e.g.,  AB  trials),  which  (1)  suggests  that  all  13	 ﾠ
participants learned the basic task and this learning carried over to the test phase, and (2)  14	 ﾠ
provides further evidence that stress did not induce a global performance deficit across  15	 ﾠ
the task (e.g., differences only emerged for novel trial types in the test phase).  These  16	 ﾠ
findings,  in  combination  with  the  fact  that  participants  across  groups  needed  a  17	 ﾠ
comparable number of training blocks to reach performance criteria during the training  18	 ﾠ
phase, also suggest that results were not likely the byproduct of psychometric artifacts.   19	 ﾠ
More  specifically,  as  highlighted  in  experiments  assessing  the  effects  of  threat  on  20	 ﾠ
working memory performance (Shackman et al., 2006), it is important to address whether  21	 ﾠ
results could be merely the artifact of an additional load on attentional resources in the  22	 ﾠ
stress condition, rather than stress per se.  If this were the case, however, we would  23	 ﾠ
expect to see global deficits in task performance for individuals who completed the task  24	 ﾠ
under  stress.    In  addition,  a  predominant  lack  of  group  differences  on  trait  and  25	 ﾠ
dispositional self-report measures (the one exception being the consummatory subscale of  26	 ﾠ
the TEPS, which was controlled for in the analyses), and no group differences at baseline  27	 ﾠ
on  any  affective  state  self-report  measures,  suggests  that  putative  differences  in  28	 ﾠ
behavioral performance or stress reactivity were not confounded by group differences in  29	 ﾠ
affect, mood, or ongoing life stress.   30	 ﾠ
   In  related  research  that  warrants  acknowledgement,  Lighthall  and  colleagues  31	 ﾠ
(2012) recently reported that participants who completed the same probabilistic stimulus  32	 ﾠ
selection task after exposure to a cold pressor stress manipulation had relatively reduced  33	 ﾠ
punishment  learning  and  increased  reward  learning.    However,  the  stressor  was  34	 ﾠ
terminated well before the beginning of the PSST (and an unrelated memory task was  35	 ﾠ
administered  between  the  stressor  and  the  PSST);  this  sequence  of  events  raises  the  36	 ﾠ
possibility that their observed results may have stemmed from ‘relief’ experienced by  37	 ﾠ
participants  after  the  stressor.    In  line  with  the  conceptualization  of  ‘stress  relief’  as  38	 ﾠ
rewarding, ‘relief’ from stressors has been associated with activation of reward-related  39	 ﾠ
neural regions (Leknes, et al., 2011) and increased dopamine levels (Navratilova et al.,  40	 ﾠ
2012).  Clearly, more research is needed to examine the putative relationship between  41	 ﾠ
negative stressors and decreased reward sensitivity, with particular focus on the temporal  42	 ﾠ
unfolding of such processes.  43	 ﾠ
  44	 ﾠ
Limitations   45	 ﾠ 
  There are several limitations to the current study that should be acknowledged.  1	 ﾠ
First, the study included only female participants due to sex differences in psychological  2	 ﾠ
and hormonal responses to stress (e.g., women demonstrate a more pronounced stress  3	 ﾠ
response  than  men;  Nolen-Hoeksema  and  Hilt,  2009).    Thus,  future  studies  will  be  4	 ﾠ
required to determine if the current stress-induced reward-specific deficits generalize to  5	 ﾠ
males.  Second, the strength of findings is limited by the fact that significant between- 6	 ﾠ
group results only emerged after re-running the main analyses of interest using a ‘stress  7	 ﾠ
reactive’ subgroup defined based on physiological and self-reported experiential indices  8	 ﾠ
of stress responsiveness.  This new ‘stress reactive’ group had a relatively small sample  9	 ﾠ
size  and  contained  participants  who  had  received  two  different  sets  of  instructions  10	 ﾠ
regarding controllability of the stressor.  However, the lack of significant differences  11	 ﾠ
between these participants (with regard to both self-report and physiological measures;  12	 ﾠ
see Supplemental Analyses) mitigates the potential effect of this latter limitation.  Third,  13	 ﾠ
it  is  important  to  acknowledge  the  inherently  limited  ecological  validity  of  an  acute  14	 ﾠ
‘threat-of-shock’ laboratory stressor and the potentially diminished strength of laboratory  15	 ﾠ
stressors that do not include a social evaluative component.  Fourth, given that findings  16	 ﾠ
from this study pertain to learning from positive vs. negative feedback, it remains to be  17	 ﾠ
seen  whether  the  patterns  found  will  generalize  to  other  types  of  rewards  and  18	 ﾠ
punishments.  Finally, in order to further evaluate whether stress-induced hedonic deficits  19	 ﾠ
are a potential mechanism underlying the link between stress and depression, it will be  20	 ﾠ
imperative to run parallel experiments in MDD individuals. In spite of these limitations,  21	 ﾠ
the  current  study  has  significant  strengths,  including  the  use  of  a  well-controlled  22	 ﾠ
experimental procedure (threat-of-shock) that allowed us to superimpose an acute stress  23	 ﾠ
manipulation to a primary task (the PSST) and has substantial translational value.  24	 ﾠ
  25	 ﾠ
    26	 ﾠ
Conclusions  27	 ﾠ
  In  sum,  results  from  these  biologically  informed  analyses  support  a  priori  28	 ﾠ
hypotheses and previous research findings (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006; Bogdan et al.,  29	 ﾠ
2010;  Pizzagalli  et  al.,  2007)  by  demonstrating  that  stress-reactive  individuals  under  30	 ﾠ
stress exhibit reduced reward processing (i.e., reduced sensitivity to positive feedback,  31	 ﾠ
evident in an impaired ability to use this reward information to guide decision making in  32	 ﾠ
novel contexts) relative to individuals not under stress.  These results are also in line with  33	 ﾠ
recent neuroimaging studies that have shown reduced activation in reward-related neural  34	 ﾠ
areas  in  response  to  stress  inductions  implemented  immediately  prior  to  reward  35	 ﾠ
processing tasks (Ossewaarde et al., 2011; Porcelli et al., 2012).  Critically, findings from  36	 ﾠ
the current study extend this area of research by providing initial evidence that these  37	 ﾠ
stress-induced deficits appear to be reward-specific and not generalizable to punishment  38	 ﾠ
processing.  Given that negative life stress often precedes depression onset (Kendler et  39	 ﾠ
al., 1999) and predicts clinical severity (Tennant, 2002), the current results also provide  40	 ﾠ
support  for  the  possibility  that  stress-induced  hedonic  deficits  may  be  a  potential  41	 ﾠ
mechanism underlying the connection between negative stress and depressive episodes.   42	 ﾠ
In this way, such results are in line with conceptualizations of stress-induced anhedonia  43	 ﾠ
as  a  potential  vulnerability  factor  for  depression  (Berghorst  and  Pizzagalli,  2010,  for  44	 ﾠ
review).    Although  promising,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  (1)  these  findings  45	 ﾠ
emerged  in  the  context  of  an  only  partially  successful  stress  manipulation  (see  46	 ﾠ 
Supplement); (2) findings emerged only after a subgroup of stress-reactive participants  1	 ﾠ
was identified; and (3) the ecological validity of the stress manipulation was limited.   2	 ﾠ
Accordingly,  these  findings  await  replications  and  conclusions  should  be  tempered.   3	 ﾠ
Future studies also need to examine whether the stress-induced rapid activation of the  4	 ﾠ
mesocortical DA system and inhibition of the mesolimbic DA system in animal models  5	 ﾠ
(Cabib et al., 2002; Cabib and Puglisi-Allegra, 1996) represent biological mechanisms  6	 ﾠ
fundamental to the current study findings.  7	 ﾠ
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Figure Legends  1	 ﾠ
  2	 ﾠ
Figure 1:   3	 ﾠ
Schematic representation of the session timeline. CORT = collection of saliva sample to  4	 ﾠ
measure cortisol level; MSQ = mood state questionnaires (“in-the-moment” state self- 5	 ﾠ
report questionnaires); PSST = Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task  6	 ﾠ
  7	 ﾠ
Figure 2:   8	 ﾠ
(A) Schematic representation of the training phase of the Probabilistic Stimulus Selection  9	 ﾠ
Task,  which  was  performed  under  stress  or  no  stress  conditions.  In  the  no-stress  10	 ﾠ
condition, every time a red border flashed, participants were instructed to press a foot  11	 ﾠ
pedal to indicate they were attending to the task. In the two stress conditions, participants  12	 ﾠ
were  instructed  that,  every  time  the  red  border  flashed,  a  shock  might  occur  in  the  13	 ﾠ
ensuing  15-30  sec.  In  the  controllable  stress  condition,  participants  were  further  14	 ﾠ
instructed that they could reduce (though not fully eliminate) the likelihood of the shock  15	 ﾠ
if  they  pressed  the  foot  pedal  when  they  saw  the  red  border  flashes.  In  contrast,  16	 ﾠ
participants  in  the  ‘uncontrollable  stress’  condition  were  instructed  that  they  had  no  17	 ﾠ
possibility of reducing the likelihood of the shock. (B) Schematic representation of the  18	 ﾠ
test phase of the Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task. No stress was presented during  19	 ﾠ
this phase.  20	 ﾠ
  21	 ﾠ
Figure 3:   22	 ﾠ
Affective ratings in the no-stress (n = 27) and stress-reactive (n = 18) group both at  23	 ﾠ
baseline and during the Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task. (A) State Trait Anxiety  24	 ﾠ
Inventory (STAI) scores; and (B) Negative Affect score on the Positive and Negative  25	 ﾠ
Affect Schedule (PANAS). For both scale, the state version was used.  26	 ﾠ
  27	 ﾠ
Figure 4:   28	 ﾠ
Performance on “Choose A” and “Avoid B” Trials in Test Phase in the no-stress (n = 27)  29	 ﾠ
and stress-reactive (n = 18) group. (A) Accuracy; (B) Reaction Time (in ms).  30	 ﾠ
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Acute stress selectively reduces reward sensitivity  1	 ﾠ
  2	 ﾠ
Supplement  3	 ﾠ
  4	 ﾠ
Supplemental Description of Measures  5	 ﾠ
  6	 ﾠ
Trait and dispositional self-report measures  7	 ﾠ
The  Beck  Depression  Inventory-II  (BDI-II;  Beck  et  al.,  1996)  is  a  21-item  8	 ﾠ
questionnaire used to measure depressive symptoms over the past 2 weeks.  It has strong  9	 ﾠ
internal reliability (.86-.92), high test-retest reliability over one-week (.93), and good  10	 ﾠ
convergent and discriminant validity (Beck et al., 1996; Segal et al., 2008; Steer et al.,  11	 ﾠ
2000).  12	 ﾠ
The  Mood  and  Anxiety  Symptom  Questionnaire  (MASQ-short)  is  a  62-item  13	 ﾠ
questionnaire used to assess symptoms of anxiety and depression over the past week with  14	 ﾠ
good convergent and discriminant validity in clinical and community samples (Watson et  15	 ﾠ
al., 1995); it yields four subscales—general distress anxious, anxious arousal, general  16	 ﾠ
distress depressive, and anhedonic depressive.    17	 ﾠ
The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen et al., 1983) is a 14-item measure used to  18	 ﾠ
assess the degree to which an individual appraises the situations in his or her life as  19	 ﾠ
stressful over the past month. Internal reliability coefficients for the PSS range from .84  20	 ﾠ
to  .86  with  a  test-retest  reliability  of  .85  (over  two  days);  the  measure  has  been  21	 ﾠ
demonstrated to have strong convergent validity (Cohen et al., 1983).  22	 ﾠ
The Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS; Gard et al., 2006) is a 14- 23	 ﾠ
item  measure  used  to  assess  individual  trait  dispositions  in  anticipatory  and  24	 ﾠ
consummatory experiences of pleasure.  The scale has good internal consistency (.71- 25	 ﾠ
.79),  high  test-retest  reliability  over  5-7  weeks  (.75-.81),  and  strong  convergent  and  26	 ﾠ
discriminant validity (Gard et al., 2006).  27	 ﾠ
The Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver  28	 ﾠ
and  White,  1994)  are  used  to  measure  individual  differences  in  sensitivity  to  two  29	 ﾠ
motivational systems purported to underlie behavior: a behavioral activation system and a  30	 ﾠ
behavioral  inhibition  system.    It  has  good  convergent  and  discriminant  validity  in  31	 ﾠ
community and clinical samples (Carver and White, 1994; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004).  32	 ﾠ
  33	 ﾠ
“In-the-moment” state self-report measures  34	 ﾠ
  The state form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S) includes 20 items  35	 ﾠ
used to quantify state anxiety levels.  Internal consistency coefficients range from .86 to  36	 ﾠ
.95,  while  test-retest  reliability  coefficients  (over  2  months)  range  from  .65  to  .75  37	 ﾠ
(Spielberger et al., 1983).  38	 ﾠ
  The state version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is used  39	 ﾠ
to measure current levels of positive and negative affect.  Internal consistency  40	 ﾠ
coefficients range from .86-.90 for the positive affect scale and .84-.87 for the negative  41	 ﾠ
affect scale; test-retest reliability coefficients (over 2 months) range from .47-.68 for the  42	 ﾠ
positive affect scale and .39-.71 for the negative affect scale (Watson et al., 1988).  43	 ﾠ
  The Challenge-Threat Questionnaire (Mendes et al., 2001) was designed to assess  44	 ﾠ
individuals’ threat appraisals (perceived resources/demands) of a task, with pre-task and  45	 ﾠ 
post-task versions.  Unfortunately, only 23 ‘controllable stress’ participants and 21  1	 ﾠ
‘uncontrollable stress’ participants completed this measure since it was added midway  2	 ﾠ
through data collection.  The pre-task version typically includes 11 statements (e.g., “The  3	 ﾠ
upcoming task will take a lot of effort to complete,” “I have the abilities to perform the  4	 ﾠ
upcoming task successfully”) that participants rate on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”)  5	 ﾠ
to 7 (“strongly agree”) to indicate how they are feeling about the task they are about to  6	 ﾠ
complete.  The pre-task version used in this study included two additional items to assess  7	 ﾠ
participants’ perceived control over general task performance, and perceived control over  8	 ﾠ
whether shocks would occur in the upcoming task.  Participants completed the pre-task  9	 ﾠ
form after receiving PSST instructions but prior to beginning the PSST.  The post-task  10	 ﾠ
version typically includes 9 statements (e.g., “The task was very demanding,” “I felt that  11	 ﾠ
I had the abilities to perform well in the task”), which participants again rate on a scale  12	 ﾠ
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) to indicate how they feel about the  13	 ﾠ
task they just completed.  The post-task version used in this study also included two  14	 ﾠ
additional items to assess participants’ perceived control over general task performance,  15	 ﾠ
and perceived control over whether shocks occurred in the task.  Participants completed  16	 ﾠ
the post-task form after finishing the PSST.  17	 ﾠ
  18	 ﾠ
Supplemental Analyses   19	 ﾠ
  20	 ﾠ
All  analyses  parallel  those  reported  in  the  main  manuscript  (Trait  and  21	 ﾠ
dispositional  self-report  measures;  “In-the-moment”  state  self-report  measures;  PSST  22	 ﾠ
training phase; PSST test phase) except they were computed using Group with three  23	 ﾠ
levels (‘no stress,’ ‘controllable stress,’ uncontrollable stress’) in mixed ANOVAs.   24	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ
Supplemental	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ 27	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
Table S1: Characteristics of Participants by the Original 3 Groups  29	 ﾠ
  30	 ﾠ
  
No Stress 
Group 
(n = 27) 
Controllable 
Stress Group 
(n = 34) 
Uncontrollable 
Stress Group  
(n = 34)  Statistics  p 
Gender  
(% female)  100%  100%  100%  N/A  N/A 
Age 
(years)  21.43 (± 1.79)  21.33 (± 2.24)  21.32 (± 2.20)  F(2,94) = 0.02  0.98 
Education 
(years)  14.81 (± 1.39)  14.44 (± 1.69)  14.26 (± 1.54)  F(2,94) = 0.96  0.39 
Marital Status           
(% single)  100%  91%  94%  χ
2(1) = 5.37  0.25 
Income                     
(% <$50,000)  90%  73%  74%  χ
2(1) = 2.29  0.32 
Compensation  
Form  
(% monetary) 
85%  91%  88%  χ
2(1) = 0.53  0.77  
Ethnicity                  
(% Hispanic)  7%  9%  6%  χ
2(1) = 0.22  0.90 
Ethnicity                  
(% Caucasian)  85%  44%  74%  χ
2(1) = 12.60  < 0.01 
BDI-II Score  1.85 (± 2.38)  2.41 (± 2.52)  2.00 (± 2.16)  F(2,94) = 0.48  0.62 
MASQ: GDA  15.52 (± 4.74)  15.50 (± 3.78)  15.82 (± 4.06)  F(2,94) = 0.06  0.94 
MASQ: GDD  16.85 (± 5.25)  18.79 (± 5.59)  17.41 (± 4.59)  F(2,94) = 1.18  0.31 
MASQ: AA  20.52 (± 4.82)  19.94 (± 4.32)  19.24 (± 2.76)  F(2,94) = 0.79  0.46 
MASQ: AD  49.56 (± 10.90)  50.15 (± 10.15)  49.26 (± 11.32)  F(2,94) = 0.06  0.94 
Perceived 
Stress Scale  19.67 (± 6.33)  21.65 (± 5.12)  19.71 (± 6.45)  F(2,94) = 1.18  0.31 
TEPS: 
Anticipatory  64.67 (± 6.68)  65.12 (± 10.20)  64.18 (± 9.46)  F(2,94) = 0.09  0.91 
TEPS: 
Consummatory  48.41 (± 5.56)  50.82 (± 6.04)  50.50 (± 6.17)  F(2,94) = 1.41  0.25 
BIS/BAS: 
Reward 
Responsiveness 
7.48 (± 1.67)  7.65 (± 2.71)  7.38 (± 1.50)  F(2,94) = 0.14  0.87 
BIS/BAS: 
Drive  9.19 (± 1.96)  8.91 (± 2.14)  9.21 (± 2.14)  F(2,94) = 0.20  0.82 
BIS/BAS:  
Fun Seeking  8.04 (± 2.16)  7.82 (± 2.36)  7.74 (± 2.12)  F(2,94) = 0.14  0.87 
BIS/BAS: 
Inhibition  16.00 (± 2.82)  15.15 (± 2.81)  15.65 (± 2.87)  F(2,94) = 0.70  0.50 
  1	 ﾠ
BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; GDA = General Distress Anxious;  2	 ﾠ
GDD = General Distress Depressive; AA = Anxious Arousal; AD = Anhedonic Depression; TEPS = Temporal Experience of Pleasure  3	 ﾠ
Scale; BIS/BAS = Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales   4	 ﾠ
  5	 ﾠ
  6	 ﾠ
Trait and dispositional self-report measures   7	 ﾠ
  There were no significant differences between groups on trait and dispositional  8	 ﾠ
self-report measures collected at baseline [all Fs < 2.09, ps > 0.13]; see Table S1.   9	 ﾠ
  10	 ﾠ
 “In-the-moment” state self-report measures   11	 ﾠ
  State anxiety. The mixed ANOVA on STAI-S scores revealed a significant main  12	 ﾠ
effect of Time [F(1,92) = 65.68, p < 0.01] and, more critically, a Time x Group interaction  13	 ﾠ
[F(2,92) = 4.72, p = 0.01]; Group was not significant [F(2,92) = 2.71, p = 0.07]. Paired t- 14	 ﾠ
tests indicated that anxiety increased from baseline to PSST in the ‘controllable stress’  15	 ﾠ
group [t(33) = 5.72, p < 0.01], the ‘uncontrollable stress’ group [t(33) = 6.29, p < 0.01],  16	 ﾠ
and the ‘no stress’ group [t(26) = 2.17, p = 0.04].  At baseline, there were no group  17	 ﾠ
differences [F(2,94) = 0.22, p = 0.81].  In line with hypotheses, anxiety levels during the  18	 ﾠ 
PSST were significantly different between groups [F(2,94) = 5.04, p < 0.01].  Follow-up  1	 ﾠ
t-tests revealed that participants in both the ‘controllable stress’ [t(59) = 2.67, p = 0.01]  2	 ﾠ
and uncontrollable group [t(59) = 3.00, p < 0.01] reported significantly higher anxiety  3	 ﾠ
than participants in the ‘no-stress’ group.  However, contrary to hypotheses, participants  4	 ﾠ
in the ‘controllable stress’ group did not differ from those in the ‘uncontrollable stress’  5	 ﾠ
group [t(66) = -0.24, p = 0.81].  6	 ﾠ
  State negative affect. The mixed ANOVA on PANAS-NA scores also revealed a  7	 ﾠ
significant  main  effect  of  Time  [F(1,92)  =  16.87,  p  <  0.01]  and  a  Time  x  Group  8	 ﾠ
interaction [F(2,92) = 3.29, p = 0.04]; Group was not significant [F(2,92) = 2.55, p =  9	 ﾠ
0.08].  Paired t-tests indicated that negative affect increased significantly from baseline to  10	 ﾠ
PSST in the ‘controllable stress’ group [t(33) = 2.76, p < 0.01] and the ‘uncontrollable  11	 ﾠ
stress’ group [t(33) = 3.50, p < 0.01], but not in the ‘no stress’ group [t(26) = 0.62, p =  12	 ﾠ
0.54].  At baseline, there were no group differences in negative affect [F(2,94) = 0.25, p =  13	 ﾠ
0.78].  However, negative affect during the PSST was significantly different between  14	 ﾠ
groups [F(2,94) = 3.52, p = 0.03].  Follow-up t-tests revealed that participants in both the  15	 ﾠ
‘controllable stress’ [t(59) = 2.02, p < 0.05] and ‘uncontrollable stress’ [t(59) = 2.61, p =  16	 ﾠ
0.01] groups reported significantly higher negative affect than participants in the ‘no- 17	 ﾠ
stress’ group. However, again contrary to hypotheses, the two stress groups did not differ  18	 ﾠ
in their level of negative affect during the PSST [t(66) = -0.85, p = 0.40].  19	 ﾠ
  State positive affect.  The mixed ANOVA on PANAS-PA scores revealed a main  20	 ﾠ
effect of Time [F(1,92) = 18.37, p < 0.01]; the Time x Group interaction [F(2,92) = 1.50,  21	 ﾠ
p = 0.23] and the Group main effect [F(2,92) = 1.05, p = 0.36] were not significant.  All  22	 ﾠ
participants reported a reduction in positive affect from baseline to PSST.  23	 ﾠ
Challenge-threat questionnaire. Contrary to hypotheses, the ‘controllable stress’  24	 ﾠ
and ‘uncontrollable stress’ groups were not significantly different in their pre-task [t(42)  25	 ﾠ
= 0.37, p = 0.71] or post-task [t(42) = 0.28, p = 0.78] threat appraisals.  Moreover, the  26	 ﾠ
two stress groups did not differ in their ratings of control over performance in the task  27	 ﾠ
prior to task onset [t(42) = -0.03, p = 0.98] or after completing the task [t(42) = 0.33, p =  28	 ﾠ
0.74].  In both groups and at both assessments, these ratings were close to “neutral” but  29	 ﾠ
fell slightly on the “disagree” side of the scale (< 4) with regard to having control over  30	 ﾠ
their performance.    31	 ﾠ
A  mixed  ANOVA  on  ratings  of  perceived  control  over  shock  with  Group  32	 ﾠ
(Uncontrollable  Stress,  Controllable  Stress)  as  a  between-subjects  variable  and  Time  33	 ﾠ
(Pre-PSST, Post-PSST) as a within-subjects variable revealed a trend for a Time x Group  34	 ﾠ
interaction [F(1,42) = 3.42, p = 0.07], with significant main effects of Time [F(1,42) =  35	 ﾠ
29.60, p < 0.01] and Group [F(1,42) = 45.64, p < 0.01].  On pre-task ratings of control  36	 ﾠ
over  shock,  the  ‘controllable  stress’  group  was  significantly  higher  than  the  37	 ﾠ
‘uncontrollable stress’ group [t(42) = 5.66, p < 0.01], as predicted; however, importantly  38	 ﾠ
and contrary to expectations, both groups again fell in the “disagree” zone of the rating  39	 ﾠ
scale (< 4).  A paired t-test within the ‘controllable stress’ group indicated that they  40	 ﾠ
reported significantly more control over the shock at their post-task than pre-task rating  41	 ﾠ
[mean increased to 5.39 ± 1.62; t(22) = 5.51, p < 0.01]; interestingly, the ‘uncontrollable  42	 ﾠ
stress’ group also had a significant increase in level of perceived control over shock from  43	 ﾠ
pre-task to post-task [2.43 ± 1.75; t(20) = 2.38, p = 0.03].  44	 ﾠ
  Overall, findings from the state measures indicate that the ‘threat-of-shock’ stress  45	 ﾠ
manipulation induced significantly higher levels of negative affect and anxiety in both  46	 ﾠ 
stress conditions than the no-stress condition, but no significant differences between the  1	 ﾠ
two stress groups.  Further indications that the stress manipulation was only partially  2	 ﾠ
successful include the following: no significant differences between the two stress groups  3	 ﾠ
on pre-task threat appraisals or perceived control over general task performance, and pre- 4	 ﾠ
task  ratings  of  control  over  shock  were  in  the  “disagree”  zone  of  the  scale  for  both  5	 ﾠ
groups.  6	 ﾠ
  7	 ﾠ
Cortisol levels   8	 ﾠ
The Time (T1 = Baseline, T2 = post-“filler” task/pre-PSST, T3 = post-PSST) x  9	 ﾠ
Group ANCOVA on cortisol levels, with “time since waking” as a covariate, revealed  10	 ﾠ
only a significant main effect of Time [F(2,176) = 11.37, p < 0.01].  Consistent with  11	 ﾠ
cortisol’s diurnal pattern, cortisol levels dropped throughout the experiment [linear effect:  12	 ﾠ
F(1,88) = 15.14, p < 0.01].  Similarly, a one-way ANOVA comparing groups on cortisol  13	 ﾠ
reactivity  scores  at  T2-T1,  and  a  separate  one-way  ANOVA  comparing  groups  on  14	 ﾠ
cortisol reactivity scores at T3-T1, yielded insignificant findings [all F < 1.78, p > 0.17].   15	 ﾠ
The unpaired t-test comparing the ‘controllable stress’ group with the ‘uncontrollable  16	 ﾠ
stress’ group on cortisol reactivity scores at T3-T1 was not significant [t(64) = 0.36, p =  17	 ﾠ
0.72], suggesting that both stress conditions yielded physiologically similar responses.  18	 ﾠ
  19	 ﾠ
PSST training phase  20	 ﾠ
  Groups did not differ in the number of completed training blocks [F(2,94) = 0.49,  21	 ﾠ
p = 0.61]; all groups took approximately 3 blocks to advance to the test phase [no-stress  22	 ﾠ
group: 3.15 ± 1.75; controllable stress group: 3.06 ± 1.50; uncontrollable stress group:  23	 ﾠ
3.44 ± 1.73].  In the ANOVA for accuracy on the final training block with Trial Type  24	 ﾠ
(AB, CD, EF) and Group as factors, there was only a main effect of Trial Type [F(2,184)  25	 ﾠ
= 14.86, p < 0.01; all other Fs < 1.30, ps > 0.30]; as expected, participants were most  26	 ﾠ
accurate on the AB trial type and least accurate on the EF trial type.  No significant  27	 ﾠ
differences emerged from the ANOVA for RT on the final training block [all Fs < 1.91,  28	 ﾠ
ps > 0.15]. Altogether, these findings indicate that (1) the probabilistic contingencies  29	 ﾠ
elicited the intended behavioral effects, and (2) groups did not differ in performance  30	 ﾠ
during the training phase.  31	 ﾠ
  32	 ﾠ
PSST test phase  33	 ﾠ
The ANOVA comparing accuracy on AB trials (the “easiest” trial type) in the test  34	 ﾠ
phase with Group confirmed that there were no significant group differences in terms of  35	 ﾠ
participants learning the basic task [F(2,94) = 0.62, p = 0.54].  For accuracy, contrary to  36	 ﾠ
hypotheses,  the  Trial  Type  (“Choose  A,”  “Avoid  B”)  x  Group  ANOVA  revealed  no  37	 ﾠ
significant effects [all Fs < 1.59, ps > 0.21].  38	 ﾠ
For RT scores, the analogous Trial Type x Group ANOVA yielded a significant  39	 ﾠ
main effect of Trial Type [F(1,92) = 29.73, p < 0.01] and a Trial Type x Group interaction  40	 ﾠ
[F(1,92) = 4.56, p = 0.01].  Follow-up analyses indicated no significant group differences  41	 ﾠ
on “Choose-A” trials or “Avoid B” trials [all ps > 0.058].  Paired t-tests revealed that  42	 ﾠ
participants in the ‘no stress’ and ‘uncontrollable stress’ groups were slower on their  43	 ﾠ
“Avoid B” trials than their “Choose A” trials [no-stress group: t(26) = 4.47, p < 0.01;  44	 ﾠ
uncontrollable stress group: t(33) = 4.49, p < 0.01].  Participants in the ‘controllable  45	 ﾠ 
stress’ condition, however, exhibited RTs that were not significantly different across trial  1	 ﾠ
types [t(33) = 0.72, p = 0.48].  2	 ﾠ
  3	 ﾠ
Supplemental Discussion  4	 ﾠ
  Inspired by non-human animal research documenting that uncontrollable stressors  5	 ﾠ
may be particular triggers of anhedonic-like behavior, we attempted to examine whether  6	 ﾠ
stressor controllability moderates the relationship between stress and reward processing  7	 ﾠ
dysfunction.  Although the stress manipulation did induce significantly higher levels of  8	 ﾠ
negative  affect  and  anxiety  than  the  no-stress  condition,  the  uncontrollable  and  9	 ﾠ
controllable stress manipulations elicited similar affective and cortisol responses, which  10	 ﾠ
was  contrary  to  hypotheses.    Notably,  these  results  echoed  patterns  with  self-report  11	 ﾠ
measures indicating that the “controllable stress” group did not actually believe they had  12	 ﾠ
control  over  the  stressor.  Accordingly,  due  to  an  only  partially  successful  stress  13	 ﾠ
manipulation, conclusions could not be drawn concerning the impact of perceived control  14	 ﾠ
over stress.  15	 ﾠ
  Contrary  to  expectations,  the  two  stress  groups  (‘controllable’  and  16	 ﾠ
‘uncontrollable’) did not differ significantly from each other in their levels of anxiety or  17	 ﾠ
negative affect.  Cortisol reactivity analyses similarly did not reveal differences between  18	 ﾠ
the ‘controllable stress’ and ‘uncontrollable stress’ groups.  Moreover, there were no  19	 ﾠ
significant  differences  between  the  two  stress  groups  on  pre-task  threat  appraisals  20	 ﾠ
(perceived  demands/personal  resources)  or  perceived  control  over  general  task  21	 ﾠ
performance.  Although  pre-task  ratings  of  control  over  shock  were  higher  in  the  22	 ﾠ
‘controllable stress’ group than the ‘uncontrollable stress’ group, both groups’ ratings fell  23	 ﾠ
in the “disagree” zone of the scale, indicating that prior to task onset, subjects in the  24	 ﾠ
‘controllable stress’ group did not actually believe that they would have control over the  25	 ﾠ
stressor.    This  lack  of  believability  may  stem  from  the  fact  that  participants  in  the  26	 ﾠ
‘controllable stress’ group were told they would be able to “significantly reduce” the  27	 ﾠ
likelihood  of  receiving  shock  by  pressing  down  on  the  foot  pedal,  but  could  not  28	 ﾠ
completely  eliminate  the  possibility  of  being  shocked  (i.e.,  they  were  not  given  29	 ﾠ
“complete” control).  Task instructions were outlined this way because of concerns that  30	 ﾠ
the latter set of instructions would not induce significantly more stress than the no-stress  31	 ﾠ
condition.  Collectively, these data suggest that the stress manipulation was only partially  32	 ﾠ
successful: significantly more negative affect and anxiety was reported by participants in  33	 ﾠ
both stress groups relative to the ‘no-stress’ group, but the controllability manipulation  34	 ﾠ
was not successful.  35	 ﾠ
  Results from this aspect of the experiment serve to highlight key variables to  36	 ﾠ
consider  in  the  design  of  future  experiments.    For  example,  the  importance  of  37	 ﾠ
administering  an  assessment  of  perceived  control  over  stress  prior  to  task  onset  and  38	 ﾠ
collecting data on a physiological index of stress (e.g., cortisol levels) to confirm the  39	 ﾠ
effects of any stress manipulation on participants.  Moreover, given that participants in  40	 ﾠ
our  ‘controllable’  stress  condition  (who  were  told  they  had  ‘partial’  control  over  the  41	 ﾠ
stressor) did not report truly believing they had control over the stressor, future designs  42	 ﾠ
warrant  including  a  ‘controllable  stress’  condition  in  which  participants  are  given  43	 ﾠ
perceived full control over the stressor.  44	 ﾠ
  45	 ﾠ